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Abstract 
In spite of a growing body of literature on risk management, our understanding of how 
companies respond to unforeseen disruptions such as pandemics or outbreaks remains limited. 
This study advances tourism management, operations strategy and risk management research 
by examining how airlines have responded to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. Using 
archival records, the study uncovered three unique stages in airlines’ responses to the outbreak. 
The study provides insights and rationale behind strategic persistence and downscaling 
approaches adopted by different airlines. The implications for risk management and public 
policy are examined.  
Keywords: Africa: Air travel: Ebola: West Africa: risk management: environmental jolts; airlines. 
Introduction  
Over the past half a century, the increasingly interconnected global economy has unleashed 
copious opportunities as well as new sources risks which can easily transmit across national 
borders to disrupt and hamper firms’ operations (World Bank, 2013; Revilla & Sáenz, 2014). 
As firms internationalise, some become increasingly vulnerable and exposed to financial, 
political and health shocks which are contagious in nature (see Bode, Wagner, Petersen & 
Ellram, 2011).  
Despite decades of research on risk management (World Bank, 2013) and environmental jolts 
(Bradley, 2015; Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009), scholars have paid little attention to the 
strategic behaviour and responses of companies in the wake of major disruptions (Bode et al., 
2011). In spite of growing concern about the international spread of deadly and contagious 
diseases (World Bank, 2013), scholars in this area have also largely circumvented how firms 
behave in such an environment. Prominent examples of such outbreaks include bird flu, Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome and, more recently, Ebola.  
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The main purpose in this paper is to examine how companies respond in the wake of major 
disruptions, e.g. global/regional outbreaks of contagious diseases. In attempting to resolve the 
deficit in our understanding, the paper focuses specifically on the contemporary issue of the 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa and how airlines responded in the wake of the outbreak. The 
Ebola outbreak has been recognised as a contemporary international business risk known as 
“tail risk”, which refers to the unpredicted and disruptive nature (Atkins & Bolger, 2014). The 
outbreak of such diseases has potential to not only disrupt the supply chain, but often leave 
many investors and businesses in a quandary.  
The study makes a number of contributions to both the business strategy and risk management 
literature. First, although some studies have indicated that firm’s responses under such 
circumstances tend to differ (Sheffi, 2005), it remains unclear as to the underlying mechanisms 
through which firms respond to such risks (Bode et al., 2011). The study seeks to fill this gap 
in our understanding by developing an integrated stage-based approach of firms’ responses to 
such disruption. Furthermore, by integrating the environmental jolts (Meyer, 1982; Bradley, 
2015) and strategic responses to environmental jolts literature (Gittell, Cameron, Lim & Rivas, 
2006), this study offers a unique lens through which to view how firms achieve resilience after 
disruption. The article further extends the existing literature by outlining strategies on how 
firms can mitigate the risk stemming from such outbreaks whilst concurrently maintaining core 
operations.  
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of the literature 
on environmental jolts and firm responses to environmental change is presented. This is 
followed by an examination of the approaches to data collection, and then an overview of the 
airline industry in Africa and the Ebola outbreak in West Africa is presented. The penultimate 
section sets out a range of airlines’ responses to the outbreak. The final section outlines the 
contributions to literature and public policy.  
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Responses to environmental jolts: An integrative review 
Environmental jolts can be defined as “transient perturbations whose occurrences are difficult 
to foresee and whose impacts on organisations are disruptive and potentially inimical” (Meyer, 
1982, p. 515; see also Bradley, 2015). In order to illuminate our understanding of how 
companies respond to environmental jolt/disruptions, the paper integrates two streams of 
literature, i.e. disruption and firm responses to environmental change.   
Disruption refers to unpredictable events that unsettle the normal flow and activities of the firm 
(Kleindorfer & Saad, 2005). Disruption can stem from both internal and external shocks 
including natural and man-made disasters. Disruptions can be conceptualised to include shocks 
which alter firms’ activities and ability to operate at normal levels (World Bank, 2013). In the 
face of environmental shocks, firm survival is often threatened which then triggers a range of 
strategic responses to re-orient with the environment (Bode et al., 2011).  
A stream of research anchored in the resource-based perspective (Barney, 1991) indicates that 
firms respond to such disruptions by turning to their resource utilisation and capability 
deployments (Juttner & Maklan, 2011). Some scholars have suggested that firms whose 
survival is threatened are more likely to redirect resources away from peripheral activities 
towards core businesses and thereby effectively reducing scope operations in favour of 
efficiency savings (Hutzschenreuter & Gröne, 2009). When external shocks alter the 
competitive environment, firms may seek new resources and expertise to help to adapt (Posen 
& Levinthal, 2012). A line of research indicates that some firms are more likely to respond by 
reducing capacity and gradually increasing it until the demand eventually returns to pre-crisis 
levels (Hutzschenreuter & Gröne, 2009). 
A stream of research has suggested that firms often employ cost retrenchment which includes 
cutting costs and implementing strict cost controls as responses to crisis (Pearce & Robbins, 
1993; Morrow, Johnson & Busenitz, 2004). Asset retrenchment encompasses the offloading of 
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assets in open markets (Morrow et al., 2004). In the face of disruption, some firms may opt to 
downscale and downscope activities (DeWitt, 1998). Downscaling refers to “a reduction in the 
scale of operations”, whilst downscoping refers to “the sale of entire business units” (Morrow 
et al., 2004, p. 191). 
 One insightful piece of work in this area by Tomlin (2006) identified two distinct responses, 
i.e. mitigation tactics (firm response in advance of a disruption which incurs costs irrespective 
of whether the incident occurs or not) and “contingency tactics” (response tactics which are 
adopted only if a disruption ensues). This line of work suggests that there can be some kind of 
stage-based approach to disruption. One stream of research has suggested that in the wake of 
such events, firms are expected to demonstrate concern for the wider society (Litz, 1996). Such 
strategic actions have been identified to position firms to win customers’ patronage in the post-
disruption environment (Litz, 1996; Revilla & Sáenz, 2014).  
A related line of research indicates that a firm’s ability to recover in a timely manner and bring 
operations to pre-disruption levels depends on factors such as resources and the nature of the 
disruption (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Indeed, well-endowed firms with slack resources can 
better absorb disruption effects and recover faster than their rivals (Sheffi & Rice, 2005). This 
can be referred to as supply chain resilience, i.e. the ability to respond and return to pre-
disruption levels (Juttner & Maklan, 2011). Building on these streams of research, Figure 1 
shows an integrated model of disruption and firm responses.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Research design  
The research context: Ebola in Africa 
Tourism was one of the fastest growing sectors across the African continent, fuelling the 
growth of aviation before the Ebola outbreak (Official Airline Guide (OAG), 2012). The 
emergence of the Ebola virus in Africa can be traced as far back as 1976 when the first case 
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was reported in the isolated regions of Sudan and in the DR Congo near the Ebola River (The 
Economist, 2014f). Although epidemiologists had been aware of the disease, in December 
2013 the first case of the recent outbreak was reported in Guéckédou, Guinea near the border 
with Liberia and Sierra Leone (The Economist, 2015). The previous outbreaks of the disease 
were largely confined to remote and relatively small populations (Fry, 2014). Suddenly, the 
devastating effects of the recent outbreak transformed Ebola from an obscure concern of 
epidemiologists into front-page news.  
Given that the symptoms resemble other more common ailments in the region such as malaria, 
the emergence and spread were largely concealed and killed many before gaining prominence 
in the international press and the wider attention of the world (The Economist, 2014f). Another 
contributory factor for the spread was the interconnected nature of trade and close proximity of 
the early cases to neighbouring countries. This meant that the disease eventually spread from 
Guinea to Liberia, Sierra Leone and beyond.  
Although Ebola was not the first outbreak to “catch the world off-guard” (World Bank, 2013), 
the three affected countries appeared less prepared to handle the disruptions to businesses and 
the wider population (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015b; The Economist, 2014f). One of the factors 
that accounted for Ebola’s scary reputation was its lethality (high mortality rate) in the face of 
very few effective vaccines or courses of treatment (Cookson, 2014). Public concern over 
Ebola also stems from the slowness of the three governments and international responses 
(Atkins & Bolger, 2014). As part of the preventative measures, individuals with suspected 
symptoms were quarantined for 21 days and kept under observation, public gatherings and 
border crossings from the affected countries were curtailed and major sports events were also 
suspended to stop the spread of Ebola (WHO, 2014). The necessary quarantines imposed by 
the affected countries virtually brought economic activity to a standstill or even sent it into 
decline (The Economist, 2014f).  
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Interestingly enough, the quarantine restricted the seasonal harvest and transportation of raw 
materials, but it helped to halt the spread of virus. For months, fear and inactivity characterised 
the economies of the three countries as quarantines became more widespread. Consequently, 
governments around the globe, including neighbouring African countries, issued advisory 
warnings against non-essential travel to the three countries. Given that the nature of the 
outbreak outpaced the capacity of the individual countries to cope with it, international 
collaborations and actions were required to respond. Indeed, the three affected nations were 
among the world’s poorest countries.  
Another explanation as to why the three affected countries struggled to contain the virus was 
the existence of weak and under-developed health systems (England & Jenkins, 2014). The 
countries had weak and poorly staffed health systems with limited preventive health measures. 
At the time, the health systems in the three countries were characterised as “under-resourced, 
under-staffed and poorly equipped” (Save the Children (STC), 2015, p. vii). Guinea spent a 
mere $62 per person on health annually compared with $3,364 in Britain, whereas Sierra Leone 
had two doctors per 100,000 people compared with 245 in the United States (The Economist, 
2014f). Indeed, in 2012, the government of Liberia spent $20 per person per year on health, 
Guinea $9 and Sierra Leone $16 compared with the $7,704 spent by the Norwegian 
government on health for each citizen (STC, 2015).  
Given that the countries faced severe capacity constraints with undeveloped healthcare sectors 
and weak governments, international organisations such as World Bank and World Health 
Organisation (WHO) helped in terms of financial and human capital to arrest the situation. By 
the first half of 2015, the number of new cases was abating and more areas were being declared 
Ebola free. However, the damage to the countries’ economies was highly visible with a death 
toll of more than 10,000 mainly in the three countries. The World Bank (2014) projected an 
estimated $32.6 billion deficit in the economies of the affected countries. Although the three 
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affected countries account for around 1 per cent of sub-Saharan economic output, the knock-on 
effects extended beyond the continent (Atkins & Bolger, 2014). One of the industries heavily 
affected in terms of firm behaviour and strategy is global civil aviation. The airline industry 
provides a fertile ground to explore this issue.  
Data sources 
Prior to the outbreak, relatively few businesses have ever had to confront and respond to an 
epidemic in a comprehensive manner. Given the unexplored and episodic nature of the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, multiple-illustrative cases approach was adopted to provide a more 
detailed and comprehensive examination of a range of airlines’ responses (see Yin, 2009; 
Welch, 2000). The account was developed by relying on archival records and publicly 
available data to analyse the effects. Archival sources such as business periodicals (e.g. The 
Economist, Airline Business and Flight International), national and local newspapers, and 
industry internet sites (e.g. Flight Global Online) were utilised.  
The archival records also included reports and press releases by airlines, WHO, International 
Air Transport Association (IATA), UK Civil Aviation Authority, International Civil Aviation 
Organization, World Bank, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and governments. 
Press releases from global airlines on Ebola and the anticipated effects on their networks and 
operations were also examined. The archival approach has been found to be particularly 
effective in exploring companies’ responses to such disruptions (Gittell et al., 2006; see also 
Amankwah-Amoah & Durugbo, 2016). Indeed, archival records are “particularly suited to 
generating developmental explanations, in other words, explaining processes of change and 
evolution” (Welch, 2000, p. 198). These data sources led to the identification of unique 
processes, patterns and dynamics of responses in the face of the disruptions. Based on this, the 
airlines’ responses to Ebola were uncovered. 
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How has the Ebola outbreak affected the airline industry? 
By the turn of the twenty-first century, the African aviation sector was gathering steam by 
improving connectivity. In the years leading up to the outbreak, Africa had come to be 
regarded as the world’s fastest growing continent (The Economist, 2013; see also Amankwah-
Amoah, 2015a) and the aviation sector has been projected to grow at an annualised rate of 
4.7% higher than the global average of 4.1% (OAG, 2014b). Although aviation supports 
around seven million jobs and contributes $80 billion to Africa’s GDP, and travel and tourism 
accounted for 8.5% of Africa’s GDP in 2013 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2013), 
progress and economic development have often been stifled by factors such as the lack of 
effective public policy and inadequate intra-African air connectivity (IATA, 2014). Indeed, the 
IATA has long stressed the importance of intra-African air connectivity in fostering economic 
development across the continent (IATA, 2014).  
Nevertheless, Africa still lags behind its global rivals in utilising air transport as a means of 
achieving sustainable development. During the course of the twentieth century, Africa’s  major 
attempt to liberalise the industry was at the Yamoussoukro Convention on Market Access for 
Air Transport in Africa in 1988 (Amankwah-Amoah, 2015c). The Yamoussoukro Declaration 
(YD) which emerged outlines steps towards the easing of restrictions inhibiting intra-African 
connectivity and served as a catalyst for further development (Amankwah-Amoah & Debrah, 
2010, 2011, 2014). The early years of the 21st century witnessed a number of initiatives by 
governments to speed up its implementation.  
Nevertheless, the YD has not been fully implemented. Indeed, it has been projected that 
liberalisation to ease restrictions of intra-African connectivity across 12 African countries (i.e. 
Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, 
Tunisia and Uganda) could create around 55,000 jobs and add about $1.3 billion to the GDP 
(InterVISTAS, 2014). The incremental deregulations in African countries such as Nigeria, 
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South Africa, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have accounted for the thriving domestic airline 
industries. Due to underdeveloped intra-African aviation connectivity of economies and trade, 
the growth potential of airlines is often constrained. 
In spite of the above constraints, connectivity between Africa and Europe has continued to 
improve partly due to the emergence of new airlines and expansion by existing players. From 
2002 to 2012, around 1,161 new routes to, from and within Africa were created as more 
airlines took advantage of the economic growth and growth in air transport in the region (OAG, 
2012). As shown in Table 1, over the course of the decade, intra-Africa connections accounted 
for 53.6% of the new routes. One of the earliest manifestations of the effects of Ebola were the 
travel bans imposed by governments of the region including Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, 
Kenya, Zambia and South Africa (Rivers, 2014). The motivation behind these actions was the 
desire to tackle the disease at source and to stop the spread. African nations such as South 
Africa and Senegal took measures including the closure of borders (e.g. Senegal and Chad) and 
a ban on travellers from the affected countries (Anderson, 2014).  
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
In addition to the bans, two main types of screenings were imposed. First was the exit 
screening in affected nations and countries that maintained air services or handled passengers 
from the affected zone. Second was the entry screening at destination airports. This was mainly 
for passengers who have been to the affected area. In addition, a policy of “enhanced 
screening” for Ebola was also introduced and implemented by countries such as the US, 
Canada and France (Carter & Meisel, 2014; Mabey, Flasche & Edmunds, 2014). Passengers 
from the affected nations were subjected to screening. Travellers had their temperatures 
checked and were required to complete a health questionnaire. The checks and screenings were 
geared towards assuring regulatory authorities and governments of their compliance. Although 
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Ebola virus is not transmitted by air, air travel has played a role in its ability to spread as 
people travel across national borders (The Economist, 2014d). As Figure 2 shows, there are 
various effects of the Ebola outbreak at local, national and regional levels. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Airlines’ responses to Ebola  
The analysis and synthesis of the archival data uncovered that airlines’ responses to Ebola 
appeared to pass through three unique stages. The first stage began with recognition of the 
outbreak but a lack of clear direction about the potential effects curtailed firms’ responses. The 
next stage entailed actions designed to reduce their levels of commitment and exposure to the 
affected countries. Here, some airlines engaged in strategic persistence even in the face of the 
environmental change. The final stage focused on recovery after the disruption. Figure 3 
demonstrates the evolution of the firms’ strategies in response to Ebola. Below we tease out 
key features of the three stages. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Stage 1: Environmental scanning – monitoring and assessment 
One of earliest effects of the outbreak was a period of monitoring and assessment –
environmental scanning. Scanning in this context refers to the steps taken by airlines to collect 
and analyse information about the outbreak to assist top executives in responding. This stage 
entails activities such as detecting and making sense of the outbreak. The data suggest that 
limited information about the virus and lack of clarity about whether airlines should continue 
or discontinue services, characterised this phase. The analysis uncovered that lack of early 
warning and surveillance systems meant that regional companies and the international 
community responses were “far too slow to identify the scale of this outbreak and to act” (STC, 
2015, p. vii). As such, firms’ responses were mute in the face of a lack of clear information and 
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directives. In addition, the isolated nature of the early cases also meant that airlines broadly 
confined their activities to scanning and making sense of the event. During this phase, the 
following quote from Kenya Airways press release exemplifies the nature of firms’ response: 
“We continuously monitor updates from WHO and the IATA on the disease, its spread and for 
guidelines on recommended actions … So far Ebola has not been declared an 
epidemic/pandemic. No travel bans or advisory have been given or recommended. Withdrawing 
our flights to these key destinations given the safeguards already placed by the respective 
governments and global health authorities would amount to a corporate placement of 
unnecessary travel advisory.” (Naikuni, 2014, p. nd) 
During this period, the WHO cautioned airlines not to discontinue air services to the affected 
countries. The uncertainty and lack of clarity of the nature, effects and scope of the outbreak 
led to strategic persistence by some airlines. In much of this period, considerable attention was 
devoted to monitoring the embryonic situation and reported new cases. Superior scanning 
capabilities appeared particularly important in airlines’ ability to respond in a timely manner.  
Stage 2: Retrenchment (downscaling) strategy  
As more evidence emerged that the initial assessment had underestimated the contagion nature 
of the virus and its ability to stay undetected during the incubation period, the panic, strong 
overreactions and confusion were as disruptive as the outbreak itself (The Economist, 2014e). 
The spread of the virus dented consumers’ confidence and disrupted some hub-and-spoke 
systems of regional airlines. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that the outbreak 
combined two potent fears, i.e. flying and contagious disease (The Economist, 2014b). 
Following the decline of tourism stemming from the cancellation of bookings, airlines were 
forced to freeze plans to expand to new routes in the region. Airlines faced regional and 
domestic shocks as tourism to countries such as Ghana and Nigeria were affected, even though 
Ghana was yet to report a single case. The preponderance of data suggests that the transition 
from Phase 1 to Phase 2 was accompanied by a sharp turn from largely monitoring and 
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assessment roles to the suspension of services by many airlines. Retrenchment in this context 
refers to the reduction of costs and elimination of routes in response to the disruption (Morrow 
et al., 2004). In the face of these government restrictions and subdued demand for travel in the 
regions, many airlines were forced to suspend services until demand returned.  
The analysis uncovered that global and regional airlines such as Air Côte d’Ivoire, ASKY 
Airlines, Arik Air, BA, Emirates Airlines and Kenya Airways suspended or cancelled a 
combined 70 scheduled flights to Liberia, 76 to Guinea and 70 to Sierra Leone (Anderson, 
2014). As more countries imposed travel restrictions and banned flights to and from the 
affected countries, air travel in the region was disrupted. The outbreak also disrupted airlines’ 
connectivity (Rivers, 2014). The airlines sought to redeploy their resources by cancelling 
flights and suspending services to many other routes. Another effect is demonstrated in the 
number of scheduled flights.  
In May 2014, there were around 427 flights from Sierra Leone and Liberia to destinations 
around the world. However, by October the same year as the number of reported Ebola 
incidents surged, many airlines became reluctant to continue air services, leading to a sharp 
decline in the number of scheduled flights to 52, a decrease of around 64% in both flights and 
seats (OAG, 2014a).  Sierra Leone was more severely affected with a 13% decline in seat 
capacity in 2014 relative to 2013 (OAG, 2014b). Indeed, in August 2014, of 590 monthly 
flights scheduled to the three countries, 216 were cancelled (OAG, 2014a; Anderson, 2014).  
Overall, the year-on-year capacity and frequency had shrunk by around 64% across the three 
affected airports (OAG, 2014a).  
Due to the interconnected nature of the airline industry in Africa, airlines across the globe also 
cancelled more than a third of international flights to three West African countries (Anderson, 
2014). In many accounts, these strategies were adopted motivated by the desire to reduce to 
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exposure. Table 2 provides a summary of a number of airlines affected by the outbreak and 
their responses. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Illustrative cases of African and non-African airlines 
The accumulated evidence suggests that the emergence of Ebola had varying effects on African 
airlines. The analysis uncovered that suspension of air services and cancellations of flights 
became very common as the effects of Ebola unfolded. Airlines whose operations were largely 
intra-African with connections to the affected countries were heavily affected. The outbreak 
disrupted some air transport networks across the region following the cancellation and 
suspension of flights by major airlines.  
One type of response was airlines purposefully seeking to circumvent the three affected 
countries. A good illustrative case is ASKY Airlines. ASKY was suspended by the Nigerian 
Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) over the transportation of the first Ebola victim into the 
country (Osuagwu, 2014). One of their passengers with the virus flew from Liberia to Nigeria 
via the Togolese capital, Lomé and thereby transmitting the disease to Nigeria. This was 
devastating for the regional player with 80 weekly flights into Lagos and Abuja (Bellanaija, 
2014). The NCAA asserted that the airline officials had failed to demonstrate effective 
preventative measures to stop new cases and adequate screening of passengers in the affected 
areas (Osuagwu, 2014). ASKY Airlines operates to 22 cities in West and Central Africa so the 
suspension had knock-on effects on its wider operations and network.  
Following this incident, in July 2014 the Pan-African airline suspended all flights to and from 
Liberia and Sierra Leone as a precautionary measure to help ensure the safety of its travellers 
(The Guardian, 2014). In so doing, it became only the second African airline, after Nigeria's 
largest airline – Arik Air, to do so in the wake of the crisis (BBC, 2014). This was 
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accompanied by the suspension of flights to Conakry (Guinea), completing the firm’s strategy 
to disconnect its network from the affected zone. The illustrative quote below provides further 
justification for the suspension: 
“We had to suspend all our weekly flights to Monrovia and [the Sierra Leonean capital] 
Freetown with the interest of our passengers in mind.” (Yissehak Zewoldi, ASKY's chief 
executive, cited in Rivers, 2014, p. 66–67)  
However, the airline was eventually allowed to resume services to the country but the damage 
to its image and operations was evident. Another good illustration was the case of Ethiopian 
Airlines, one of the fastest growing African Airlines. Although Ethiopian Airlines’ main hub is 
in Addis Ababa, the interconnected nature of today’s global airline industry meant that it was 
also heavily affected. The airline had developed an extensive route network across the 
continent to major destinations in West Africa which was disrupted. In response to the 
outbreak, the company trained both frontline staff both on-ground at airports and on-board 
about the causes of the disease and its mode of transmission (Ethiopian Airlines, 2014). The 
firm also instituted measures to train their staff to minimise the possibility of contagion 
(Ethiopian Airlines, 2014). Similarly Kenya Airways and many airlines also upgraded the skills 
of their workers. As Titus Naikuni, the then CEO of Kenya Airways, noted:  
“Our crew members have also been supplied with and trained on the use of Universal 
Precaution Kits (UPKs) to ensure that they do not come into contact with body fluids while 
carrying out their duties.” (Naikuni, 2014, p. nd)  
This was also motivated by airlines’ desire to protect their workers in the wake of the outbreak.  
By late 2014, it was reported that Ethiopian Airlines was losing about $8 million a month in 
sales largely due to concern about Ebola, cancellations and postponements of trips to the West 
African region (Wall, 2014). In 2014, Kenya Airways also reported around $110 million loss 
stemming from the effects of the Ebola outbreak in West Africa (Agbugah, 2014). The airline 
was affected by the suspension of flights to Sierra Leone and Liberia in August 2014, two 
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important destinations in West Africa which fed its network (Wokabi, 2014). Even where 
airlines are operating other routes, they are often affected by under capacity due to inability to 
connect passengers from the suspended routes to feed their network. The preponderance of 
evidence thus far suggests that the effects of the outbreak on air travel appeared to be 
“regional” (OAG, 2014b).  
One explanation for this was that the three affected countries are not like major hubs such as 
Dubai and therefore the effects of the outbreak were confined to mainly a few inter- and intra-
African routes. The analysis revealed that a handful of non-African airlines also suspended 
services to the affected countries. Prominent examples include British Airways, Emirates and 
Air France. In August 2014, British Airways suspended its four-times-weekly flights to two 
countries heavily affected by the disease, i.e. Liberia and Sierra Leone (Freeman, 2014). In 
suspending its services, the British flag carrier attributed the decision to the deteriorating public 
health situation in the two countries. The company’s press release stated: 
“We have temporarily suspended our flights to and from Liberia and Sierra Leone … due to the 
deteriorating public health situation in both countries … The safety of our customers, crew and 
ground teams is always our top priority and we will keep the routes under constant review in 
the coming weeks.” (BA press release) 
Although major airlines such as BA suspended services, other major airlines such as Air France 
and Dubai's Emirates Airline initially reduced capacity in response to the crisis (OAG, 2014a). 
Consequently, Emirates also suspended Guinea flights and Air France also discontinued 
services to Sierra Leone which was in sharp contrast to its previous position that it would 
maintain air links to all affected countries (Rivers, 2014).  
Strategic persistence  
Although the outbreak was expected to trigger common responses by all airlines, strategies of 
airlines diverged as some opted to stay whilst others opted to retrench. The WHO 
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recommended that airlines maintain air services to help provide transport for aid workers and 
medical cargo, however, multiple airlines suspended services. One of the most striking aspects 
of firms’ responses was the strategic persistence adopted by some. In sharp contrast to the 
strategies adopted by the other airlines, Royal Air Maroc (Morocco's largest airline) and 
Brussels Airlines continued to offer services to the three affected countries (Worland, 2014). In 
justifying their decision to maintain air services, Geert Sciot, a vice president at Brussels 
Airlines, noted:  
 “It is our humanitarian duty to operate there … without our fights it would become almost 
impossible for medical staff to reach the country.” (Cited in Worland, 2014, p. 1)  
The central insight of these cases helps us to better understand why firms in the same 
environment react differently to such disruptions. This is more so for global companies where 
the operations can easily become the mechanism for diseases to spread. One of the significant 
roles of the airline industry in the wake of the crisis was to maintain links to the affected 
countries as a means of helping facilitate the transportation of supplies and medical staff to the 
affected zone. Indeed, the containment of the disease partly depended on health professionals 
gaining access to equipment and materials.  
Stage 3: Recovery stage 
This stage entails recovering the firms’ operations to the level before the effects of Ebola 
unfolded. By the first half of 2015, the decline in the number of new infections also led to 
incremental easing of restrictions on routes and ushered a new landscape where recovery from 
Ebola appeared on the horizon. The decline of new cases was also followed by a number of 
airlines reinstating services suspended during the height of the Ebola-induced downturn in the 
industry and returning aircraft into service. The finding suggests that economic activities were 
severely hampered largely due to the necessary quarantine measures, but also due to a loss of 
confidence in the system and fear of getting infected by the virus. For many regional airlines 
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this meant reinstatement of suspended flights and unfreezing of expansion plans before the 
crisis.  
The analysis found that one of the main barriers to recovery stems from stigmatisation of some 
firms.  Stigmatisation and fear not only disrupted firms’ operations but also made recovery 
difficult to achieve (Blas, 2014). Some countries and firms have come to be stigmatised by the 
outbreak (England & Jenkins, 2014). Although the epicentre of the disease was the three 
affected countries, it has been suggested that “the whole continent is suffering the stigma” as 
travellers cancel business and leisure trips to unaffected countries (England & Blas, 2014). The 
cancellation of bookings appeared to have made recovery difficult to achieve.  
A large number of press reports suggest that although around five of the 54 African countries 
were affected, there has been stigmatisation of some nations and airlines. Indeed, Korean Air 
Lines cancelled flights to Kenya which had not reported any outbreak at the time. Given the 
nature of the disease and potential contagion, some airlines which were slow in cancelling 
flights were stigmatised. The case of Ethiopian Airlines helps to illustrate this point. Although 
the airline consequently suspended services to the affected zones as retrenchment and 
suspension of services became more widespread across the population, the late response drew 
some criticism. As the fears of negative publicity associated with disconnecting services to the 
affected countries faded, downscaling gained momentum across the industry. Paradoxically, a 
number of airlines were criticised for not responding quickly enough to the Ebola outbreak and 
were subsequently stigmatised. The quote below from one of the articles entitled “Ethiopian 
Airlines should be called Ebola Airlines” captures the emotional sentiments:  
“Ethiopian Airlines remains the only carrier in East Africa to continue several flights daily to 
these affected regions … While Addis Ababa is playing on African solidarity sentiments to 
cover its negligent role in potentially spreading Ebola to the region … until the Ethiopian 
dictatorship suspends flights to West African regions suffering from the Ebola outbreak, 
Ethiopian Airlines should be called Ebola Airlines.” (Madote, 2014, p. nd)  
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The extensive network of the airline and its high visibility in the region helped in attracting 
unwanted scrutiny by stakeholders. The analysis uncovered that the final stage was 
characterised by firms’ attempt to prepare better for future outbreak. There are some 
indications, however, that the outbreak also added to the cost of doing business as the fears left 
many companies without employees (Atkins & Bolger, 2014). During this post-disruption 
environment period, airlines drew insights from the event and devoted more attention to how 
they could quickly adapt and respond to such risks in a timely manner. 
Discussion and conclusions 
This article sought to examine how companies respond in the wake of major disruptions by 
focusing specifically on airlines’ responses to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. This paper, 
therefore, offers a timely analysis of how airlines have responded to the Ebola outbreak. 
Although the disruption to firms’ operations was significant, their responses appeared to entail 
three key stages. The stages highlight the early uncertainty of the nature of the risks. The early 
stage sheds light on the embryonic effects of the virus and lack of clear implications which 
means temporary persistence in the face of lack of information. The preparedness of firms’ 
responses was at a minimum. As the nature of the outbreak became noticeable and the nature of 
spread became clear, many airlines began to respond through retrenchment and downscaling 
strategies. This period entailed suspension and cancellation of services as they sought to avoid 
the three main affected countries. The retrenchment strategy occurred immediately after the 
first stage as global and regional airlines began to reduce their exposure to the affected areas.  
Nevertheless, airlines such as Royal Air Maroc and Brussels Airlines engaged in broadly 
strategic persistence by maintaining continuous services to key routes to the affected areas even 
in the face of suspension of services by rival airlines. This demonstrates that airlines did not 
simply imitate the strategies of others blindly but were quite selective in their strategies 
influenced by firm-specific factors. The analysis indicates that these firms were largely 
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motivated by humanitarian factors. The final stage emphasises strategies geared towards 
recovery and creating resilient organisations capable of dealing with similar crises. The 
transition to resilient organisation in the post-outbreak environment is rooted in the unique 
capabilities and resources of individual airlines.  
Contributions to theory and practice 
The paper makes key contributions to the literature. First, although past studies have stressed 
risk management as a route to organisational resilience (World Bank, 2013), our understanding 
of firm strategies for doing so remains limited. The study fills this void in our understanding by 
developing an integrated framework which elucidates firms’ behaviour under such conditions. 
In addition, in spite of an accumulating body of literature on risk management and disruptions, 
the relationship between the two remains underexplored. By integrating the two streams of 
literature, our study adds specificity to how organisations respond to environmental shocks. 
The study also addresses one of the important, but largely unaddressed, questions in strategy 
research, i.e. why firms facing the same industry conditions act and react differently to crises 
and disruptions (Livengood & Reger, 2010).  
From a managerial standpoint, the paper reinforces a need for airlines to shift from unplanned 
responses to such outbreaks towards a proactive approach which emphasises timely allocation 
of resources and expertise. Proactive scanning of the business environment can help companies 
respond to similar disruptions in a timely manner. In addition, there is also a need to diversify 
their scope of activities and routes to be able to withstand sudden falls in demand connected to 
such outbreaks.  
From a public policy standpoint, the study indicates a need for effective and integrated 
communication systems to provide earlier warning signals to international agencies and 
aviation authorities to help countries attract additional resources to help contain such outbreaks 
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(Amankwah-Amoah, 2015b). Such actions can alert authorities to an outbreak of contagious 
disease and thereby mitigate any potential disruption.  
Furthermore, the findings indicate a need for local monitoring in tandem with effective 
healthcare systems and warning systems. There is also a need for underdeveloped countries to 
upgrade the expertise of health professionals such as doctors and nurses to meet new 
challenges. In addition, the findings indicate the need for governments to identify effective 
mechanisms to determine which air routes are to be cancelled or suspended in the wake of 
outbreaks to help contain them. The paper provides preliminary insights which can be further 
explored using a larger sample than has been used here. 
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Table 1: Number of intra and inter-Africa routes created between 2002 and 2012 
Area Number of new routes Percentage share 
Intra-Africa  623 53.661 
Inter-Africa   
 Europe 407 35.056
Middle East 91 7.838 
Asia 22 1.895 
North America 10 0.861 
Latin America 5 0.431 
Southwest Pacific 3 0.258 
Data source: OAG, 2012 
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Table 2: Summary of some airlines affected by the Ebola outbreak 
List of 
airlines  
Country of 
origin  
Effects and responses 
African airlines  
Senegal 
Airlines 
Senegal  Temporarily stopped air services to Sierra Leone.  
 The airline has put investment plans on hold. 
 The airline experienced considerable delays due to new 
security measures. 
South 
African 
Airways  
South Africa  Postponement/cancellation of flights. 
Kenya 
Airways  
Kenya  Froze services to Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 Training of some employees. 
Ethiopian 
Airlines 
Ethiopia  The airline has sought to reduce capacity as a means of 
mitigating the effects. 
 Screening of staff for signs of infection.  
 New training of some employees. 
ASKY 
Airlines 
Togo  Suspended services to the three affected countries.  
 Restricted employees’ movement. 
Air Côte 
d'Ivoire 
Côte d'Ivoire  Suspended the launch of new air services to the three countries. 
Gambia Bird Gambia  Temporarily stopped services to and from Sierra Leone. 
 Suspended the launch of new air services to the three countries. 
Arik Air Nigeria  Halted direct flights to Liberia and Sierra Leone  
 Postponed the launch of new air services to the three countries.  
Non-African airlines  
Air France France   Temporarily stopped air services to and from Sierra Leone. 
 The airline stocks fell and flights were scaled back. 
British 
Airways  
UK  Suspended air services to Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 Temporarily stopped services to and from Sierra Leone.  
Korean Air 
Lines  
S. Korea  Suspended flights to and from Kenya, its only destination in 
Africa at the time. 
Emirates United Arab 
Emirates 
 Suspended Guinea flights. 
Data sources: synthesised by the authors from: Freeman, 2014; Rivers, 2014; Anderson, 2014; OAG, 
2014a. 
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Figure 1: A unified framework of organisational responses to disruption  
 
 
Figure 2: The environmental effects of the Ebola outbreak 
 
 
29 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of firms’ response to Ebola 
 
 
 
 
 
